CRi    13L6 

f  dm, 


Duke  University  Libraries 

Message  of  the 
Conf  Pam  #441 


SENATK,  Jan.  >;.  18(^5.— Referred  to  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs.  Fkij.  17,  ISO-^ — Messafje  and  accompaM3'ing  documents 
ordered  to  be  printed,  and  injunctic^i  of  secrecy  removed. 


MESSAGE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT. 

Richmond,  Va.,  Jan.  4,  1865. 

To  the  Sc?iafe  of  (he  ConfaJcnite  S/afes : 

In  response  to  your  resolution  of  November  14th,  18fi4, 
I  herewith  transmit,  for  your  information,  a  conmiunication  from  the 
Secretary  of  AVar,  covering  a  copy  of  the  official  rej>ort  of  General 
J.  E.  Johnston,  relative  to  operations  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee. 

I  invite  your  attention  to  the  Secretary's  remarks  in  reference  to 
the  delay  which  has  occuri'<.'d  in  lespanding  to  your  resolution,  and 
concur  with  him  in  suggesting  that  it  i.^  not  advisable  lo  publish  this 
communication  at  present,  or  at  a  future  time,  without  the  corres- 
pondence which  was  contemporaneous,  and  which  explains  the  events. 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


COMMUNFJATION  FROM  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

Confederate  States  of  America, 
War  Department, 

Richmond,  Va.,  Jan.  3,  1865. 

To  fhe  P resilient  of  iJie   Cuvfedcrate  States: 

Sir: 

'  I  herewith  submit  a  copy  of  the  report  of  Gen.  Joseph 
E.  Johnston,  called  for  by  a  resolution  of  the  Senate.  Some  delay 
has  occurred  in  forwarding  this  cop)',  because  at  first  I  doubted 
whether,  from  its  tendency  to  induce  controversy,  it  could  be  com- 
municated without  prejudice  to  the  public  service.  When  afterwards 
I  determined  to  send  it,  without  objection  on  that  score,  I  thought  it 
might  be  expedient  to  accompany  it  with  copies  of  the  cotempora- 
neous  corresj)ondence  and  documents,  which  tended  to'  elucidate  it 
and  give  a  fuller  view  of  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  cam- 
paign. This  entailed  further  delay  in  having  such  correspondence 
and  documents  collected  and  copied.  On  examining  them,  I  conclu- 
ded they  would  ))r()bal)ly  only  add  to  controversies,  and  be  productive 
of  more  mischief  than  beneht,  and  have  consequently  contented  ni}'- 


self  with  submitting,  as  I  now  do,  the  report  alone,  hoping  that 
while  it  may  afford  information  to  Congress,  its  publication  may  be 
forborne,  as,  in  my  judgment,  such  publication  would  not  be  promo- 
tive of  the  public  interest. 

Very  respectfully. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

JAMES  A.  SEDDON, 

Secretary  of  War, 


OFFICIAL  REPORT  OF  GEN.  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON. 

ViNEViLLE,  Ga.,  October  20,  18G4. 
Gen.  S.  Coopeu,  Adfl  and  Insp't  Gcnoal: 

Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  the 
operations  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  while  it  was  under  my  com- 
mand. Want  of  the  reports  of  the  Lieutenant  Generals,  for  which  I 
have  waited  until  now,  prevents  me  from  being  circumstantial. 

In  obedience;  to  the  oi'dijrs  of  the  Presidjnt,  rjcived  by  telegraph 
at  ('linton,  Mississippi,  December  I  8th,  18G3,  I  assumed  command  of 
the  Army  of  Tennessee  at  Dalton,  on  the  'ili\\  of  that  month. 

Letters  from  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War,  dated  respec- 
tively 23d  and  20th  of  Dv'cember,  impressed  upon  me  the  importance 
of  soon  commencing  active  operations  against  the  enemy.  The 
relative  forces,  inclmling  the  moral  effect  of  the  affair  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  condition  of  the  artillery  horses,  and  most  of  those  of  the 
cavalry,  and  want  of  field  transportation,  made  it  impracticable  to 
eff'n^t  tlie  wishes  of  the  Kxecurive. 

On  the  31st  of  Di!cenjber  the  effective  total  of  the  infantry  and 
artillery  of  the  arniy,  including  two  brigades  belonging  to  the  De- 
partment of  jMissis-^ippi,  was  tliirtv-six  thousand  eiulit  hundred  and 
twenty-six ;  tlie  effective  total  of  the  cavalry,  including  Roddy'.3 
command  at  Tiiscumbia,  was  five  thousand  six  hundred  and  thirteen. 
Tin;  federal  force  in- our  front,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  and  the  ninth 
ami  twenty-tliird  cor[)s  at  Knoxville,  was  estimated  at  eighty 
thousand. 

The  winter  was  mainly  employed  in  improving  the  discipFuK;  and 
equipment  of  tfie  army,  and  bringing  back  a!)sentees  to  the  ranks. 
At  the  end  .of  April  more  than  five  thousand  had  rtyoined  their 
regiments. 

The  horses  of  the  cavalry  and  artillery  had  bi;en  much  reduced  in 
condition  by  the  [)revious  campaign.  As  full'supplies  of  forage  could 
not  be  furnished  tliem  at  Dalton,  it  was  necessary  to  send  about  half 
of  each  of  these  arms  of  service  far  to  the  rear,  where  the  country 


could  furnish  food.  On  that  account  Brig.  Gen.  Roddy  was  ordered, 
with  about  three-fourths  of  his  troops,  from  Tuscunibia  to  Dalton, 
and  arrived  at  the  end  of  February.  On  the  2d  of  April,  however, 
he  was  sent  back  to  his  former  position  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

On  the  loth  and  Uirh  of  January  Baldwin's  and  Quarles'  brigades 
returned  to  the  Department  of  Mississippi  and  East  Louisiana,  to 
which  they  belong«'(i.  His  Excellency  .Joseph  E.  Brown  added  to 
the  army  two  reginnMits  of  State  troops;  which  were  used  to  guard 
the  rail  road  bridgrs  between  Dalton  and  Atlanta. 

On  the  17th  of  February  the  President  ordered  me,  by  telegraph, 
to  detach  Lieut.  Gen.  Hardee,  with  the  infantry  of  his  corps,  "  except 
Stevenson's  division,"  to  aid  Lieut  Gen.  Polk  against  Sherman  in 
Mississippi.  This  ordei-  was  obeyed  as  pron)ptly  as  our  means  of 
transportation  permitted. 

The  force  detached  was  probably  exaggerated  to  Maj.  Gen.  Tho- 
nnas ;  for  on  the  23d  the  federal  army  advanced  to  Ringgold ;  on  the 
24th  d'-ove  iu  our  outi)osts,  and  on  the  2oth  skirmished  at  Mill  creek 
g}i[>.  and  m  Crow  valley,  east  of  Rocky  Face  mountain.  We  were 
successful  at  both  places.  At  the  latter,  Clayton's  brigade,  after  a 
sharp  action  of  half  an  hour,  defeated  double  its  number.  At  night 
it  was  reported  that  a  U.  S.  brigade  was  occupying  Dug  gap,  from 
which  it  had  driven  our  troops.  Granbury's  Texan  brigade,  return- 
ing from  jNIississippi,  had  just  arrived.  It  was  ordered  to  march  to 
the  foot  of  the  mountain  immediately,  and  to  retake  the  gap  at  sun- 
rise, next  morning ;  which  was  done.  In  the  night  of  the  26th  the 
enemy  retired. 

On  the  27th  of  February  I  suggested  to  the  Executive,  by  letter, 
through  Gen.  Bragg,  that  all  [(reparations  for  a  forward  movement 
should  be  made  without  further  delay.  In  a  letter  dated  1th  of 
March,  Gen.  Bragg  desired  me  to  have  all  thiugs  ready  at  the  earliest 
practicable  moment,  for  the  movement  indicated.  In  replying  on 
the  12th,  I  reminded  him  that  "the  regulations  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment do  not  leave  such  j>rej>ai'ations  to  Cdunnanders  of  troops,  but 
to  officios,  who  receive  their  orders  from  Richmond."  On  tluj  ISth 
a  letter  was  received  from  Gen.  Bragg,  sketching  a  plan  of  ott'ensive 
operations,  atnl  enumerating  the  troops  to  be  used  in  them,  under 
me.  I  was  invited  to  express  my  views  on  the  subject.  In  doing 
80,  both  by  telegraph  and  mail,  I  suggested  modifications,  and  urged 
that  the  additional  troops  named  should  be  sent  inniiediately,  to 
enable  us,  should  the  enemy  advance,  to  beat  him,  and  then  move 
forward;  or  should  he  not  advance,  do  so  ourselves.  Gen.  Bragg 
replied  by  telegraph  on  the  21st,  "Your  dispatch  of  10th  does  not 
in  iieate  acceptance  of  plan  jtroposed  Troojis  can  only  be  drawn 
from  other  points  for  advance.  Upon  your  decision  of  that  point, 
further  action  must  deytend."  I  replied  by  tel»!graph  on  the  22d, 
"In  my  dispatch  of  1 9th,  I  expressly  accept  taking  offensive;  only 
differ  with  yuw  as  to  details.  I  assume  that  the  enemy  will  be  pre- 
pared for  advance  before  we  will,  and  will  make  it  to  our  advantage: 
therefore,  I  propose,  both  for  offensive  and  defensive,  to  assemble  our 
troo[)s  here  immediately."     This  was  not  noticed.     Therefore,  on  the 


■#-y- 


25th  I  again  urged  the  necessity  of  reinforcing  the  Armv  of  Ten- 
nessee, because  the  enemy  was  coUectiiig  a  hirger  force  than  that  of 
the  hist  campaign,  while  onrs  was  less  than  it  ha<l  been  then. 

On  the  ;Jd  April  Ln.  Col.  A.  H.  Cole  arrivtsd  at  Dalton,  to  direct 
the  procuring  of  artilkMy  horses  and  held  transportation,  to  cnal'it! 
the  army  to  advance. 

On  the  -ith,  under  Orders  32,  of  1864,  I  applied  to  the  Chief  of 
the  Conscript  Service  for  one  thousand  negro  teamst'MS.  None  were 
received. 

On  the  8th  of  April  Col.  12.  S.  Ewell,  A.  A.  General,  was  sent  to 
•Richmond  to  represent  to  the  President  my  wish  to  take  the  offensive 
witl>  pro|)er  means,  andi:o  learn  his  views.  A  few  days  after,  Brig. 
Gen.  Pendleton  arrived  from  Richmond,  to  ex[)lain  to  me  th(i  Pi!;si- 
dent's  wishes  on  tlie  subject.  I  e.\[)!ained  to  him  the  modification  of 
the  plan  communicated  by  Gen.  Bragg,  which  seenied  to  me  essen- 
tial; which  required  that  the  intended  reinforcements  should  be  sent 
to  Dalton.  1  urged  that  this  should  be  done  without  delay,  because 
our  present  force  was  not  sufficient  even  lor  defence,  and  to  enal>ie 
us  to  take  the  offensive,  if  the  enemy  did  not. 

On  the  1st  of  May  I  reported  the  enemy  about  to  advance.  On 
the  2d  Brig.  Gen.  Mercer's  command  arrived — about  fouiteon  hun- 
dred effective  infantry.  •  On  the  ■14th  I  .v.xpressetl  myself  satisfied 
that  the  enemy  was  about  to  attack  with  his  united  forces,  and  again 
urg(}d  that  a  part  of  Lieut.  Gen.  Polk's  troops  shoiihl  he  pirt  at  my 
disposal.  I  was  infoiined  by  Gen.  l^ragg  that  orders  to  that  efft'ct 
were  given. 

Maj.  Gen.  Martin,  whose  division  of  cavali'y,  cominii  from  East 
Tennessee,  had  been  halted  on  the  Etowah  to  recruit  irs  horses,  w;>s 
ordered  with  it  to  observe  the  Oostanaiila,  from  Resaca  to  Rome;  and 
Brig.  Gen.  Kelly  was  ordei'ed  with  his  command  from  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Resaca,  to  report  to  Maj.  Gen.  Wheeler. 

The  effective  artillery  and  infantry  of  the  Ami}''  of  Tenui'ss<>e, 
after  the  arrival  of  Mercer's  brigade,  amounted  to  forty  thousand  and 
nine  hundred;  the  etfective  cavalry,  to  about  four  thousand.  Maj. 
Gen.  Sherman's  army  was  conijjosed  of  that  of  Missionary  Ridge 
(then  eighty  thousand),  increased  by  several  thousand  recruits;  five 
thousand  tlien  under  Hovey;  the  twcnty-thirii  coi'ps  (Schoheld's), 
from  Knoxville,  and  i;wo  divisions  of  the  sixteenth,  from  North 
Alabama. 

Major  Gen.  Wheeler  estimated  the  cavalry  of  that  aimy  at  fifteen 
thousand. 

On  the  5th  of  May  this  army  was  in  line  between  Ringgold  and 
Tunnel  hill,  and  after  skirmishing  on  that  and  tin;  ibilowing  day,  on 
the  7th  pressed  back  our  advanced  troops  to  Mill  crcrk  gap.  On  the 
same  day  Brig.  Gen.  Canty  reached  Resaca  with  his  brigade,  and  v/as 
halted  there. 

On  the  8th,  at  4  P.  M.,  a  division  of  Hooker's  corps  assaulted  Dug 
gap,  which  was  bravely  held  by  two  regiments  of  Reynolds'  xVrkan- 
sas  brigade,  and  Grigsby's  brigade  of  Kentucky  cavalry,  fighting  on 
foot,  until  the  arrival  of  Lieut.  Gen.  Hardee  with  Granbury's  brigade, 
when  the  enemy  was  put  to  flight. 


5 

On' the  9th  five  assaults  were  made  on  Lieut.  Gen.  Iloed's  troops 
on  Rockv  Face  mountain.  All  were  rejjuised.  In  ilie  tilternoon  a 
report  was  received  that  Logan's  and  Dodge's  cor[is  were  in  Siiak" 
Creek  gap.  Tiiree  divisions,  under  Lieut.  Gen.  Hood  were  therefoie 
sent  to  R«vsica.  On  tlu;  JOth  Lent.  Gen.  Hood  repoited  the  etuMuy 
retiring.  Skirmishirig  to  our  advantage  eontinued  all  day  near  l)al- 
ton.     iAIaj.  Gen.  I^ate  nM^mlsed  a  vigorous  atrack  af  night. 

On  the  I  Mil  Iirig.  Gen.  Canty  reported  thai  ihe  enemy  were  again 
approa(diing  Resaca.  Lt.  Gen.  Polk  arrived  there  in  the  evening, 
with  Loring's  division,  and  u'as  insrrncted  to  dt-jrud  the  )>!afe  with 
those  troops  and  Canty's.  The  usual  skirinisliiug  eontinued  near 
Dal  ton. 

Roeky  Fnco  mountain  and  Snake  Creek  gap,  at  its  south  end  com- 
pletely covered,  for  the  enemy,  the  o])erati()n  ot  turning  Dalton.  Oe. 
the  r2th  the  federal  army,  covered  Jiiy  the  mountain,  moved  by  Snake 
Creek  gap,  towards  Resaca.  Major  Gen.  Wheeler,  with  twenty-two 
hundi'ed  of  ours,  attacked  and  defeated  loore  tlian.donhle  that  nuniber 
of  federal  cavalry,  near  Vainell's  station.  At  night  our  artillery  and 
infantry  marched  for  Resaca.  The  cavaliy  followed  on  the  |:.th. 
On  that  day  the  eiicuiy  approaching  on  tlu^  Snake  (Jreek  gaj)  road, 
was  checked  by  Loring's  troop>,  wiiich  gave  timt;  for  tlu^  tormation 
of  Hardee's  and  Hood's  corps,  just  arriving.  As  the  enemy  was 
foruH'd,  the  lefr,  of  Polk's  corps  was  on  the  (")ostananla,  ainl  the  lighr 
o(  Hood's  on  the  Connasauga.  Tiiere  was  l.)risk  skirmishing  dui-ing 
tin;  afrei'uoon  on  Polk's  from  and  Hardee's  Icit 

On  tin;  14th  the  enemy  iiia<ic  several  attacks — tln>  most  \igorons 
on  Hiiwhnan's  division  (Hood's  left.)  All  were  hmidsomidy  repulsed. 
At  ()  P.  M.  Hood  advanced  with  Stevenson's  and  Stewart's  divisions, 
supp(uted  bv  t-wo  of  Waik<rs  brigades,  driving  the  enemy  froni  his 
ground  before  night.  He  was  instructed  to  be  ready  to  continue  the 
ollensive  next  njorning.  At  9  P.  .M.  I  harned  thatLuut.  Gen.  Polk's 
troops  had  lost  a  position  commanding  our  bri'lges,  and  received  from 
Maj.'  Gen.  j\Iartin  a  report  that  federal  infantry  was  crossing  the 
Oostanaula,  near  Calhoun,  on  a  ])ontoon  bridge.  The  instrnclions  to 
Lt.  Gen.  Hood  were  revoked,  and  Walker's  division  sent  tojhe  point 
named  by  Major  Gen.  Martin. 

On  the  l-')th  there  was  stivere  skirmishing  on  liit^  whi>h>  front. 
Major  (ien.  Walkei-  re[)orted  no  movement  ni  ar  Calhoun.  Lt.  Gen. 
Hood  was  directed  to  prepare  to  move  forward,  his  right  leading, 
supported  by  two  brigades  from  Polk's  and  Hiixlee's  corps.  When 
he  was  about,  lo  move,  infttrmat-ion  canu;  trom  Major  (Jen.  AValker 
that  the  federal  right  was  crossing  the  river.  To  meet  this  move- 
ment, Lieut.  Gen.  Ilood's  atiiick  was  counteruianded.  Stewart's 
division  not  receiving  the  order  from  Corps  Head  Quarters  in  rime, 
attacke«J  unsuccessfully.  Tin;  army  was  ordered  to  cross  ihe  Oosra- 
naula  that  night,  destruyiug  iht?  biidges  behind  it. 

On  the'  <)th  the  enemy  cross«xl  the  0<.»stanania.  Lieut.  (Jen. 
Hardee  skirmished  with  them  snccssfull}'  near  (Jallionn. 

The  liict  that  a  part  of  Polk's  tioops  were  still  in  tin;  r(;ar,  and 
the  great  numerical  superiority  uf  the  i'ederal   army,  made  it  expe- 


d'i'iit  to  risk  battle  only  when  position  or  some  blunder  of  the  enemy, 
iii'tirht  give  us  counterbalancing  advantages.  I  therefore  determined 
to  tall  hack  slowly  until  circumstances  should  put  the  chances  of 
b.iirle  in  our  favor,  keeping  so  near  the  U.  S.  army  as  to  prevent  its 
s;  uding  reinforcements  to  Grant;  and  hoping,  by  taking  advantage 
of  [)ositions  and  opportunities,  to  reduce  the  odds  against  us,  by  par- 
t'll  engagements.  I  also  expected  it  to  be  materially  reduced  before 
(h:-  end  of  June,  by  the  expiration  of  the  terms  of  service  of  many 
of  the  regiments  which  had  not  re-enlisted.  In  this  way  we  fell 
lt;i(k  to  Cassville,  in  two  marches.  At  Adairsville,  about  midway,  on 
tue  17th  Polk's  cavalry,  under  Brig.  Gen.  Jackson,  met  the  enemy, 
and  Hardee,  after  severe  skirmisliing,  (diecked  them.  At  this  point, 
on  the  ISth  Polk's  and  Hood's  corj)s  took  the  direct  road  to  Cassville; 
Hardee's,  that  by  Kingston  About  half  the  tiederal  army  took  each 
road.  • 

French's  division  having  joined  Polk's  corps  on  the  ISth,  on  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  when  half  the  federal  army  was  near  Kingston, 
the  two  cor[)s  at  Cassville  were  ordered  to  advance  against  the  troops 
that  had  followed  them  from  Adaii"sville,  Hood's  leadiui;  on  the  rieht. 
When  this  corps  had  advanced  some  two  miles,  one  of  his  staff 
officers  reported  to  Lieut.  Gen.  Hood  that  the  enemy  was  approach- 
ing on  the  Canton  road,  in  lear  of  the  right  of  our  original  position. 
Ht*  drew  back  his  troops,  and  formed  them  across  that  road.  When 
it  was  discovered  that  the  officer  was  mistaken,  the  opportimity  had 
passed,  by  the  near  ap[)roafii  of  the  federal  armv.  Expecting  to  be 
attacked,  I  drew  up  the  troo[)s  in  whut  seemed  to  me  an  excellent 
position,  a  bold  ridge,  iminediatt;ly  in  tear  of  Cassville,  with  an  open 
valley  before  ii.  The  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  comnjenced  soon 
after  tht^  troops  were  formed,  and  continued  until  night.  Soon  after 
dark  Lieut.  Gens.  Polk  and  Hood,  together,  expressed  to  me  decidedly 
the  o|)inion  formed  upon  tlie  observation  of  the  afternoon,  that  the 
federal  artillery  would  render  their  positions  untenable  the  next  day, 
and  urged  me  to  abandon  the  ground  immediately  and  cross  the 
Etowah  Lieut.  Gen.  Hardee,  whose  position  I  thought  weakest, 
was  conlirflent  that  he  could  liold  it.  The  other  two  officers,  however, 
were  so  earnest  and  unwilling  to  depen<l  on  the  ability  of  their  corps 
to  defend  the  ground,  that  I  yielded,  and  the  army  crossed  the  Etowah 
on  the  20th — a  step  which  I  have  regretted  ever  since.  Wheeler's 
cavalry  was  j>laced  in  observation,  above  and  Jackson's  below  the 
rail  road. 

On  the  22d  Maj.  Gen.  Wheeler  was  sent,  with  all  his  troops  not 
required  for  observation,  to  the  enemy's  rear;  and  on  the  2-tth  beat 
a  briga<le  at  Cassville,  and  took  or  burned  250  loaded  wagons.  In 
the  mean  time  the  enemy  was  reported  by  Jackson's  trooj)s,  moving 
down  the  Etowah,  as  if  to  cross  it  near  Stilesboro,  and  crossing  on 
the  23d.  On  the  24th  Polk's  and  Hardee's  corps  reached  the  road 
from  Stilesboro  to  Atlanta,  a  few  miles  south  of  Dallas;  and  Hood's 
four  miles  from  New  Hope  church,  on  the  road  from  Alatoona.  On 
the  25th  the  enemy  was  found  to  be  entrenched  near  and  east  of 
Dallas.     Hood's  corps   was  placed   with   its  centre  at  New  Hope 


church,  and  Polk's  and  Hardee's  ordered  between  it  and  the  Atlanta 
road,  which  Hardee's  left  was  to  cover.  An  hour  before  siins-'r, 
Stewart's  division  iit  New  Hope  church  was  fiercely  attacked  by 
Hooker's  corps,  which  it  repulsed,  after  a  hot  engiigmient  of  two 
hours.  Skirmishin<5  was  kept  up  on  the  2Gth  and  27th.  At  half  past 
5  P.  M.,  on  the  27th,  Howard's  corps  assailed  Cleburne's  division, 
and  Wiis  driven  back  about  dark  with  great  shiughter.  In  ihese  two 
actions  oui'  troo|:)S  were  not  entrenched.  Our  loss  in  each  wsis  .ibout 
four  hundred  and  lifty  in  killed  and  wounded.  On  the  27tli  the 
enemy's  dead,  except  those  borne  off,  were  counted  six  huiMlred. 
We  therefore  estimate  their  loss  at  thnn^,  thousand  sit  least,  h  was 
probably  greater  on  the  25th,  as  we  had  a  larger  force  engaged  rhen, 
both  of  artUlery  and  infantry. 

The  usual  skirmishing  was  kept  up  on  the  28th.  Lieut.  Gen. 
Hood  was  instructed  to  put  his  corps  in  position  during  tiie  niglit.  to 
attack  the  enemy's  left  flank  at  dawn  next  morning — the  rest  of  the 
army  to  join  in  the  action,  siiccessivelvi  from  right  to  left. 

Oil  the  29th  Lieut.  Oen.  Hood,  liiiding  the  feticrnl  left  covered  by 
a  division  which  had  entrenched  itself  in  the  ninht,  thouiirht  it  inex- 
pedient  to  attack,  so  reported  and  asked  for  instruction^.  As  the  re- 
sulting delay  made  the  attack  inexpedient,  even  if  it  had  not  been  so 
before,  by  preventing  the  surprise,  u[»on  which  success  in  a  great  de- 
gree dtq)(:iided,  he  was  recalled. 

Skirmishing  continued  until  the  4th  of  June,  the  enemy  giadiuilly 
extending  his  entrenched  line  towar<ls  the  rail  road  at  Acworth.  On 
the  morning  of  the  -5th  the  army  was  forme<l,  with  its  left  at  Lost 
niountiiin,  its  ciMitre  near  Gilgath  church,  and  its  right  near  the  rail 
road.  On  the  7th  the  right,  covered  l)y  Noond.-i}-  creek,  was  extendt-d 
across  the  Acworth  and  Marietta  road.  The  enemy  approached  under 
cover  of  successive  lines  of  entrenchments.  There  was  brisk  and  in- 
cessant skirmishing  until  the  18th. 

On  the  14tli  the  biavt;  Lieut.  Oen  Polk,  distinguished  in  ev^ry 
battle  in  which  this  army  had  fought,  fi-ll  by  a  ciinnon  shot,  ,it  .-in 
advanced  post.  M;ij.  Gen.  Lonng  suecerded  lo  the  command,  which 
he  held  until  the  7th  of  July,  with  great  efHciency. 

On  tf.e  4tli  of  June  a  letter  fiom  (Jlo\«'iti(tr  Brown  informed  me 
that  he  h;id  organized  a  divisicm  ot  infjintry.  an<l  j)'aced  it  under  my 
orders.  Thest?  troops,  when  ready  f<M"  service  ;i!)out  the  middle  of  the 
monlli,  mider  Maj.  Gen.  G.  W.  Smith,  were  employed  to  defend  the 
crossings  of  the  Chattahoochee,  to  [ncN-ent  the  surprise  of  Atlanta  by 
tlx'  federal  eavjiby. 

On  the  K)th  a  new  line  wms  taken  by  the  army.  Hood's  crps, 
with  its  right  on  the  Marietta  and  Canton  load,  L'iring's  on  the  Kcn- 
ne.saw  mountain,  and  Hardee's  with  its  left  exri-nding  across  the  Lost 
njountain  and  Mariett  i  road.  The  eneii;y  apjvroached,  as  usual,  under 
cover  (if  entenc-hnumts.  In  this  position  thei-e  was  incessant  fight- 
ing and  skirmishing  until  July  3d,  the  enemy  giailually  extending  his 
entrenched  right  towards  Atlanta.  On  the  20th  of  June  Whei-ler, 
with  eleven  hundred  men,  routed  Garrard's  division  of  fedi-ral  cavalry 
on  our  right.     On  the  21st  Hood's  corps  was  tiaiisfeiied   fiom   righf^ 


8 

to  left.  Wlu'dvi's  ciivulry  taking  cli.irge  of  the  position  it  had  left. 
Oil  rill'  22i\  LiiMit,  Gen.  Hood  reported  that.  Hin(hiian's  and  Steven- 
M)ii">  (rvisioiis  .-f  liis  corps,  being  attacked,  drove  back  the  enemy, 
tasking  a  line  of  iiis  breastworks,  but  were  compelled  to  withdraw 
1»3'  thi'  fire  of  tbrritied  artilh'rv.  On  the  24th  Hardee's  skirmishers 
t()i-iiiH(]  ;i  liiii'  of  batth',  :is  did  Stevenson's  of  Hood's  corps  on  the 
:ior!i.  On  thf  •  7rh,  after  a  furious  cannonade  of  several  hour-,  the 
(Tieiiiy  made  a  gcuicral  advance,  but  was  every  where  repulsed  with 
lieav}'-  loss.  Tiie  iiss.-iults  wei'i!  most  vigorous  on  Cheatham's  and 
Clel)urne's  divisiuns  of  Haidee's  corps,  and  French's  and  Feathers- 
ton's,  of  Loriiig's.  L'eut.  Gen.  Hardee  reports  that  Cheatham's  di- 
vision lost  in  kiilcil,  vv(junded  and  missing,  one  hundred  and  ninety- 
five.  The  enemy  opposed  to  it.  by  the  statement  of  a  staff  officer, 
subsequently  captured  two  thousand:  the  loss  of  Cleburne's  division 
eleven  ;  that  of  the  enemy  on  liis  front,  one  thousand  ;  and  ]\[aj. 
Gen.  Lori ng  re})orted  two  hundred  and  thirty-six  of  his  corps  killed, 
woundt^d  and  missing;  and  the  loss  of  the  enemy,  by  their  own  esti- 
mates, at  between  twenty-fiv(^  hundred  and  three  thousand;  which 
he  th.inks  very  smiill. 

On  the  1st  of  Jul\-  Major  General  Sunth's  division  was  ordered  to 
support  the  cavaliy  on  our  left.  Their  effective  total  was  about 
fifteen  hundred.  On  the  2d,  the  enemy's  riglit  being  nearer  to  At- 
lanta by  several  miles  than  our  left,  the  army  fell  back  during  the 
night  to  Smyrna  chui-ch.  On  the  4th  Major  Genei'al  Smith  reported 
that  he  should  be  compelled  to  withdraw,  on  the  morning  of  tlie  5th, 
to  the  line  of  entrenchuunits  coveiing  the  rail  road  bridge  and  Tur- 
ner's ferry.  The  army  was  therefore  ordered  to  retire  at  the  same 
time  to  that  lino,  to  secure  our  bridges.  The  cavalry  crossed  the 
Chattahoochee — Wheeler  ohsei'ving  it  foi"  soms'  tw^tuity  miles  above, 
and  Jackson  as  fai-  bi'lovc.  Tije  enemy  advanced,  as  usual,  covered 
by  entrenchments  Skirmishing  continued  until  the  9th.  Our  in- 
fantry and  artillery  were  brought  to  the  southeast  side  of  the  river 
tiiat  night,  because  two  fderai  corps  had  crossed  it  above  Powers' 
ferry  on  the  Sth  and  entrenched.  Lieut.  Gen.  Stewart  took  coni- 
niand  of  the  corps  on  the  7th. 

The  character  of  Peachtiee  creek,  and  the  numerous  fords  in  the 
Chattahoocliee  above  its  mouth,  ])rev('nted  my  attempting  to  defend 
that  part  of  the  river.  Tlie  broad  and  muddy  channel  of  the  creek 
would  have  separated  the  twi»  parts  (jf  the  army.  It  and  the  river 
below  its  mouth  were  therefiu'e  taken  as  our  line.  A  position,  on 
the  high  ground  south  of  the  creek,  was  selected  for  the  army,  fi"om 
which  to  attack  the  enemy  \AJule  crossing.  The  engineer  officers, 
with  a  large  force  of  negroes,  were  set  lo  work  to  strengthen  the 
fortifications  of  Atlanta,  and  to  n.ount  on  them  seven  heavy  rifles, 
borrowed  from  Majoi'  Geneial  AFaury.  The  Chief  Engineer  was  in- 
structed to  devote  his  altention  first  to  tln^  works  between  the  Deca- 
tur and  Marietta  roads,  to  put  them  in  such  condition  that  they  might 
be  held  by  the  State  troops,  so  that  the  arniy  might  attack  the  enemy 
in  flank  when  he  approached  the  town— this,  in  the  event  that  we 
should  be  unsuccessful  in  attacking  the  federal  army  in  its  passage  of 
Peachtree  cnek. 


After  the  armies  were  separated  by  the  Chattahoochee,  skirmishing 
became  less  severe.  On  tlie  14th  a  (Mvision  of  federal  cavah'y  crossed 
the  river  by  Moore's  bridge,  near  Newman,  but  was  driven  back  by 
Armstrong's  brigade,  sent  bv  15rig.  Gen.  Jackson  to  meet  it. 

On  the  15th  Governor  Brown  informed  me  orally  th.-it  he  hoped  to 
reinforce  the  army,  before  the  end  of  the  month,  with  near  ten  thou- 
sand State  troops. 

On  the  17th  the  main  body  of  the  federal  army  crossed  the  Chat- 
tahoochee, between  Roswell  and  Powers'  ferry.  At  If)  o'clock  P. 
M.,  while  I  was  giving  Lieut.  Col.  Prestman,  Chief  Engineer,  in- 
structions in  regard  to  his  work  of  the  next  day. on  the  fortilications 
of  Atlanta,  a  telegram  was  received  from  General  Cooper,  informing 
me,  by  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  as  I  had  failed  to 
arrest  the  advance  of  the  enemy  to  the  vicinity  of  Atlanta,  and  ex- 
pressed no  confidence  that  I  could  defeat  or  repel  him,  I  was  relieved 
from  the  command  of  the  Army  and  Department  of  Tennessee,  which 
would  be  immediately  turned  over  to  Gen.  Hood.  This  was  done  at 
once.  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  the  enemy  was  reported  to  be 
advancing,  and  at  Gen.  Hood's  request  I  continued  to  give  orders 
until  the  afternoon,  placing  the  troops  in  the  position  selected  near 
Peachtree  creek. 

In  transferring  the  command  to  Gen.  Hood,  I  explained  my  plans 
to  him,  first,  to  attack  the  finleral  army  while  crossing  Peachtree 
creek.  If  we  were  successful,  great  results  might  be  hoped  for,  as 
the  enemy  would  have  both  the  creek  and  the  river  to  interrupt  his 
retreat.  Second,  if  unsuccessful,  to  keep  back  the  enemy  by  en- 
trenching, to  give  time  for  the  assembling  of  the  State  troops  pro- 
mised by  Governor  Brown  ;  to  garrison  Atlanta  with  those  troops; 
and  when  the  federal  army  approached  the  town,  attack  it,  on  its 
most  exposed  flank,  with  all  the  Confederate  troops. 

These  troops,  who  had  been  for  seventy-four  days  in  the  immediate 
presence  of  the  enenn^  laboring  and  fighting  daily,  ensuring  toil, 
exposure  and  danger  with  equal  cheerfulness,  more  confident  and 
high  spirited  than  when  the  federal  army  presented  itself  near  Dal- 
ton,  were  then  inferior  to  none  who  ever  served  the  Confederac)\ 

Under  the  excellent  administration  of  Brig.  Gen.  Macakll,  Chief 
of  Staff,  the  troops  were  well  equipped,  and  abundantly  supplied. 
The  draught  animals  of  the  artillery  and  Quartermaster's  Depart- 
ment were  in  better  condition  on  the  18th  of  July  than  on  the  5th 
of  Ma}'.  We  lost  no  material  in  the  retreat,  except  the  four  field 
pieces  mentioned  in  the  accompanying  report  of  Gen.  Hood. 

I  commenced  the  campaign  with  Gen.  Bragg's  army  of  Missionary  ' 
Ridge,  with  one  brigade  added  (Mercer's,  and  two  taken  away), 
Baldwin's  and  Quarles'.  That  opposed  to  us  was  Grant's  army  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  then  estimated  at  eighty  thousand  by  our  princi])al 
officers,  increased,  as  I  have  stated,  by  two  corps,  a  division  and 
several  thousand  recruits,  in  all,  at  least  thirty  thousand  men.  The 
cavalry  of  that  army  was  estimated  by  Maj.  Gen.  Wheeler  at  fifteen 
thousand. 

The  reinforcements  which  joined  our  army  amounted  to  fifteen 
2 


10 

• 

thonsnnd  infantry  and  artillery,  and  four  thousand  cava]r)\  Our 
scouts  reported  much  greater  numbers  joining  the  U.  S.  army — ^gar- 
risons {lud  bridge  guards  from  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  relieved  by 
♦'one  hundred  days'  men,"  and  ihe  seventeenth  corps,  with  two  thou- 
sand cavah'y. 

The  loss  of  our  infantry  and  artillery,  from  the  5th  of  May,  had 
been  about  ten  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  four  thousand 
seven  hundred  from  all  other  causes — mainly  slight  sickness  pro- 
duced by  heavy  cold  rains,  which  prevailed  in  the  latter  half  of 
June.  These  and  the  slightly  wounded  were  beginning  to  rejoin 
their  regiments.  For  want  of  reports,  I  am  unable  to  give  the  loss 
or  the  services  of  the  cavalry,  which  was  less  under  my  eye  than 
the  rest  of  the  army.  The  elilictive  strength  was  increased  by  about 
two  thousand  during  the  campaign. 

The  eflective  force  transferred  to  Gen.  Hood  was  about  forty-one 
thousand  mfantry  and  artillery,  and  ten  thousand  cavalry. 

Ac-cording  to  the  opinions  of  our  most  experienced  officers,  daily 
reports  ot  prisoners,  and  statements  of  northern  papers,  the  enemy's 
loss  in  action  could  not  have  been  less  than  five  times  as  great  as 
ours.  In  the  cases  in  which  we  had  the  means  of  estiuiaring  it,  it 
ranged  from  seven  to  one,  to  ninety-one  to  one,  compared  vvirli  ours, 
and  averaged  thirteen  to  one.  The  federal  prisoners  concurred  in 
saying  that  their  heaviest  loss  occurred  in  the  daily  attacks  made  in 
line  of  battle  upon  our  skirmishers  in  their  rifle  pits.  Wlietlier  they 
succeeded  in  dislodging  our  skirmishers  or  not,  their  loss  was  heavy, 
and  ours  almost  nothing. 

At  Dalron  the  great  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy  made  the 
chances  of  battle  much  against  us;  and  even  if  beaten,  they  had  a  safe 
refuge  behind  the  fortifitni  pass  of  Ringgold,  and  in  the  Jortrcss  of  Chat- 
tanooga. Our  refuge  in  case  of  defeat  was  in  Atlanta,  one  hundred 
miles  off,  with  three  I'ivcrs  inteivening.  Tijerefore,  viciory.  for  us 
could  have  been  decisive,  while  defeat  would  have  been  utterly  disas- 
trous. ]jetween  Dalron  and  the  Chattahoochee  we  could  Imve  given 
battle  only  by  attacking  the  enemy  entrenched,  or  so  near  enrrench- 
ments  that  the  only  resvilt  of  success  lo  us  would  have  been  iiis  falling 
back  mto  them,  while  defeat  would  have  been  our  I'uin.  lu  the  course 
puisued,  our  troops, always  fighting  under  cover,  had  very  tiifhng  losses 
com])ared  with  those  rhey  inflicted  :  so  that  the  enemy's  uuujerical 
superiority  was  reduced  daily  and  rapidly,  and  we  could  reasonably 
have  expected  to  cope  with  the  fedeial  aiiny  on  equal  ground  by  the 
time  tlie  Chattahooclie(;  was  passtid.  Defeat  on  this  sidcM)!'  ili«}  riv^er 
would  have  been  its  destruction.  We,  if  beaten,  had  a  jtlace  of  refuge 
in  Atlanta,  too  strong  to  be  assaulted  and  too  extensive  to  hit  in- 
vested. I  had  hoped  also  that  by  the  breaking  of  the  rail  r();i<l  in  its 
rear,  the  federal  army  might  be  coi.Mpiilled  to  attack  us  in  a  position 
of  our  own  choosing,  oi  to  a  retreat  (iasily  converted  into  a  rout. 
After  we  crossed  the  Etowah  five  <letachments  of  cavalry  were  suc- 
<tess!vely  sent,  with  instructions  to  destroj-^  as  much  as  they  could  of 
the  rad  road  between  Dalton  and  the  Etowah.  All  failed,  because 
too  W::!ak.     We  could  never  spare  a  sufficient  body  of  cavalry  for 


11 

this  service,  as  its  assistance  was  absolutel}^  necessar}'  in  the  defence 
of  every  position  vi^e  occupied,  Capt.  Harvey,  an  officer  of  great 
courage  and  sagacity,  was  detached  on  this  service  v/itli  one  hundred 
men  on  the  1 1th  of  June,  and  remained  for  several  weeks  netir  the 
rail  road,  frequently  interrupting,  altliougli  not  strong  enongli  to  pre- 
vent its  use.  Early  in  the  campaign  the  stjitemcnrs  of  the  strength 
of  the  cavalry  in  the  Department  "f  Mississippi  iiml  East  Louisiana, 
given  me  by  Lt.  Gen.  Polk,  jnst  from  the  comniand  of  rliat  Depart- 
ment, and  my  telegraphic  correspondence  with  his  successor,  Lt.  Gen. 
S.  D.  Lee,  gave  me  reason  to  hope  that  a  competent  force  could  be 
sent  from  ]\[ississippi  and  Alabama  to  prevent  tiit;  use  of  the  rail  road 
by  the  U.S.  army.  I  therefore  suggested  it  to  the  President  directly, 
on  the  l;{th  June  and  Kith  July,  .iiul  through  General  IJragg,  (»n  the 
:30th,  12th,  1-Uh,  Kith  and  26tii  of  June;  and  also  to  Lt.  Gen.  Lee, 
on  the  iOth  May,  and  ;kl,  llth  and  IGth  of  June.  I  did  so,  in  the 
belief  tli;it  this  cavalry  w(uild  serve  the  (^)nJedei;icy  better,  by  causing 
the  defeat  of  Major  Gen.  Shernuin's  army,  than  by  repelling  a  raid 
in  j\Iississi[)pi. 

Besides  the  causes  of  n)y  remov.-d,  alleuvd  in  the  telegi-am  an- 
nouncing it,  various  other  aecusiitions  have  heen  nuide  against  me — 
some  [uiblished  in  news}>ai)ers,  in  such  a  maniKn"  as  to  ap[)('ar  to  have 
official  authority,  and  utheis  circulated  orally  in  Ueoi'gia  and  Alabama, 
and  imputed  to  Gen.  Bragg. 

The  principal  are,  th;it  1  persistently  disregarded  the  instructions 
of  the  President;  that  I  would  not  fight  the  enemy;  that  I  refused 
to  defend  Atlanta  ;  that  I  refused  to  connnunicate  with  Gen.  Jjraijjj 
in  relation  to  the  operations  of  the  army;  that  I  disregarded  his 
entreaties  to  change  my  course  and  attack  the  enemy  ;  and  gross 
exaggerations  of  the  losses  of  the  army. 

I  had  not  the  advantage  of  I'eceiving  the  President's  instructions  in 
relation  to  the  manner  of  conducting  the  camjiaign  But  as  the  con- 
duct of  my  predecessor  in  retreating  before  odds  less  than  those  con- 
fronting me,  had  apparently  been  approved,  and  as  Gen.  Lee,  in  keep- 
ing on  thf>  defensive  and  retreating  towaids  Grant's  objective  point, 
under  circumstances  like  mine,  was  adding  to  his  great  fame,  both  in 
the  cstim>ition  of  the  administration  ;ind  people,  I  supposed  that  n)y 
course  would  not  be  censured.  I  believed  then,  as  I  do  now,  that  it 
was  the  only  one  at  my  conmuind  which  promised  success. 

I  think  that  the  foregoing  narrative  shows  thab  the  Arniy  of  Ten- 
nessee did  fight,  and  with  at  least  as  much  effect  as  it  had  ever  done 
before. 

The  proofs  that  I  intended  to  hold  Atlanta,  are,  the  fact  that  under 
my  order.s  the  work  of  strengthening  its  defences  was  going  on  vigo- 
rously, the  commnnication  on  the  subject  made  by  me  to  Gen.  Ilood, 
and  the  fact  that  my  family  was  in  the  town.  That  the  public  work 
shops  were  remov«Ml,  and  no  large  supplies  deposited  in  the  town,  as 
alleged  by  Gen.  Bragg,  were  measures  of  couuuon  prudence,  and  no 
more  indicated  the  intention  to  abandon  the  place  than  the  sending 
the  wagons  of  an  army  to  the  rear  on  a  day  of  battle,  proves  a  fore- 
gone determination  to  abandon  the  field. 


12 

While  General  Bragg  was  at  Atlanta,  about  the  middle  of  July,  we 
had  MO  other  conversation  concerning  the  army  there,  than  such  as  I 
introduced.  He  asked  me  no  questions  regarding  its  operations,  past 
or  future;, made  no  comments  upon  them,  nor  suggestions,  and  had 
not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  that  Atlanta  would  not  be  de- 
fended. He  told  me  that  the  object  of  his  journey  was  to  confer 
with  Li.  Gen.  Lee,  and  comnuinicate  with  Gen.  E.  K.  Smith,  in  rela- 
tion to  reinforcements  for  me.  He  talked  much  more  of  affairs  in 
Virginia  than  in  Georgia,  asserting,  what  I  believed,  that  Sherman's 
army  outnuml>ered  Grant's,  and  impressed  me  with  the  belief  that 
his  visits  to  me  were  unofficial. 

A  copy  of  a  brief  report  by  Gen.  Hood,  accompanies  this. 

Most  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON,   General. 

Official  : 


L(.  Col.  ^  A.  A.  General. 


13 


keport  of  general  hood. 

Head  Quarters,  Hood's  Corps, 
In  the  field, 1864. 

Gen.  J.  E.  Johnston,  Macoti,  Ga.: 

Agreeable  to  the  directions  of  the  General  command- 
ing, 1  have  the  honor  herewith  to  submit  the  operations  of  the  troops 
under  my  command,  since  the  7th  of  May.  C3n  that  day  Maj.  Gen. 
Stewart,  with  his  division,  took  position  at  Mill  creek  gap  in  Rocky 
Face  mountain,  three  miles  northeast  of  Dalton,  the  enemy  appearing 
in  his  imniediare  front.  In  the  aftei-noon  Maj.  Gen.  Bate,  with  his 
division,  reported  to  me,  and  was  placed  in  position  on  the  left  of 
Stewart  and  west  of  rail  road.  On  the  Sth  Maj.  Gen.  Cheatham, 
with  his  division,  reported  to  me,  ont;  brigade  of  which  was  placed 
in  position  on  the  right  of  Stewart  and  along  the  crest  of  Rocky 
Face.  On  the  right,  the  division  of  Maj.  Gen.  Stevenson  was  in  posi- 
tion and  extending  across  Crow  valley.  Gen.  Hindman  occupying  the 
right  of  my  line.  Some  skirmishing  took  place  along  the  line  on 
the  Sth,  and  on  the  9th  the  enemy  made  five  ditferent  attempts  to 
gain  the  mountain,  but  were,  each  time,  driven  back  and  foiled  in  all 
their  attempts.  After  this  nothing  of  very  great  importance  occurred 
up  to  the  time  the  army  marched  for  Resaca.  On  arriving  there  I 
took  position  on  the  right  of  the  army — Plindman's  division  on  my 
left,  Stevenson  in  the  centre,  and  Stewart  on  the  right.  On  the  14th 
the  enemy  made  repeated  assaults  on  Hindnian's  left,  but  not  in  very 
heavy  hues.  Walthall's  brigade  occupying  the  left  of  Hindman, 
suffered  severely  from  an  enfilade  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  him- 
self and  men  dis[)laying  conspicuous  valor  throughout,  under  very 
adverse  circumstances.  Brig.  Gen.  Tucker,  commanding  brigade  in 
reserve,  was  severely  wounded.  About  the  middle  of  the  day  on  the 
1.5th  the  enemy  made  assaults  upon  Stevenson's  front  and  the  right 
of  Hindman  in  several  lines  of  l)attle,  each  successive  line  being  re- 
pulsed with  loss.  At  4  o'clock  P.  M.  Gen.  Stewart  moved  forward 
from  the  right  with  his  division,  di'iving  the  enemy  before  him,  but 
was  subsequently  forced  to  resume  his  original  position  before  largely 
superior  numbers.  During  the  attack  on  Gen.  Stevenson,  a  four  gun 
battery  in  position  thirty  paces  in  front  of  his  line,  the  gunners  being 
driven  away  from  it  and  the  battery  left  in  dispute,  the  army  with- 
drew that  night,  and  the  guns,  without  caissons  or  limber  boxes, 
were  abandoned  to  the  enemy,  the  loss  of  life  it  would  have  cost  to 
withdraw  these  being  considered  worth  more  than  the  guns.  After 
this,  the  march  was  continued  to  the  south  side  of  the  Etowah,  via 
Adairsville  iiiid  Cassvilh* — some  slight  skirmishing  at  the  latter  place. 
On  tin'  morning  of  the  24th  the  march  was  resumed  in  the  direction 
of  Dallas,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  with  my  entire  command, 
I  arrived  at  New  Hope  church,  four  miles  east  of  Dallas.  About 
midday  the  enemy  were  reported  advancing,   when  my  line  was 


14 

formed.  Hindman  on  the  left,  Stewart  in  the  centre,  and  Stevenson 
on  the  right.  At  5  o'clock  P.  M.  a  very  determined  attack  was  made 
upon  Stewart,  extending  along  a  very  small  poKion  of  J>rown's  bri- 
gade of  Stevenson's  division.  The  engagement  continued  actively 
until  night  closed  in,  the  enemy  being  repeatedly  and  hatidsomely 
repulsed  at  all  points.  Thus  Hooker's  entire  corps  was  driven  back 
by  three  brigades  of  Stewart's  division.  Prisoners  taken  were  of  ' 
that  corps.  Too  much  praise  cannot  be  awarded  to  the  artillery, 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  Col.  Beckham,  which  did  great 
execution  in  the  enemy's  ranks,  and  added  much  to  their  discom- 
fiture. On  the  morning  of  the  :26th  the  enemy  were  found  to  be  ex- 
tending their  left.  Hindman's  division  was  withdrawn  from  my  left 
and  placed  in  position  on  the  right,  the  enemy  continuing  to  extend 
his  left.  Maj.  Gen.  Cleburne,  with  his  division,  was  ordered  to  re- 
port to  me,  and  was  massed  on  Hindman's  right. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  the  enemy  were  known  to  be  extending 
rapidly  to  their  left,  attempting  to  turn  my  riuht  as  they  extended. 
Cleburne  was  deployed  to  meet  them,  and  at  half  [)ast.  five  P.  M.  a 
very  stubborn  attack  was  made  on  h!s  divisi'  n,  extendi/ig  to  the  right, 
whei'e  Maj.  Gen.  Wheeler,  with  his  cavalry  dismounted,  was  engag- 
ing them.  The  assault  was  continued  with  great  determination 
upon  both  Cleburne  and  Wheeler  until  after  night,  but  --very  attempt 
to  break  their  lines  was  gallantly  repulsed.  About  ten  o'clock  at 
night,  Brig.  Gen.  Granbury,  with  his  brigade  of  Texans,  made  a  dash- 
ing charge  on  the  enemy,  driving  them  from  the  tiehl,  their  killed  and 
wounded  being  left  in  our  hands.  During  this  engagmnent  two  or 
three  hundred  prisoners  were  captured,  all  belonging  to  Howard's 
corps.  After  the  engagements  around  New  Hope  chui'ch,  nothing  of 
very  great  importan(;e  transpired  whilst  occupying  that  line  The 
army  changed  position  to  Lost  mountain,  my  corps  in  the  centre. 
Afterwards  I  moved  to  the  right  near  Kennesaw  mountain;  subse- 
quently changed  position  to  the  extreme  lefc  of  the  army;  however 
nothing  of  importance  occuried  on  my -line  whilst  in  tliis  position, 
save  tliat  on  the  22d  of  June  the  divisions  oT  Stevenson  and  Hind- 
man  attacked  the  enemy,  driving  him  from  two  lines  of  works,  and 
capturing  some  prisoners  belonging  to  Schofield  and  Hooker.  From 
here  the  army  changed  position  to  vicinity  of  Nickajack  creek,  my 
corps  on  the  left.  We  subsequently  withdrew  from  this  position,  and 
took  up  a  line  on  the  immediate  north  bank  of  the  Chattahoochee 
river.  After  remaining  here  for  several  days,  the  arm}'  crossed  the 
river,  and  went  into  bivouac. 

For  further  particulars,  I  refer  you  to  reports  of  Generals  of  divi- 
sions. I  enclose  Maj.  Gen.  Cleburne's  report,  and  will  forward  others 
as  soon  as  received. 


Official . 


Respectfully, 
(Signed)  J.  B.  HOOD,  Ll  Gen. 


Lieut.  Col.  Sf  A.  A-  Gene-id. 


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